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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Innovation intermediaries, that is, intermediary organisations that support firm-
level and collaborative innovation (henceforth: intermediaries), are a varied set of 
organisations that provide either networking services (e.g. support to R&D 
partnership formation and to university–industry collaborations) or other 
knowledge-intensive services (e.g. knowledge and technology mapping, various 
types of consultancy) or both (Bessant and Rush, 1995; Hargadon and Sutton, 
1997; Den Hertog, 2000; Howells, 2006; Wagner et al., 2014). Since 
intermediaries can facilitate knowledge exchange among organisations with 
different languages, cultures, decision-making horizons, systems of incentives and 
objectives (Howells, 2006; Russo and Rossi, 2009; Caloffi et al., 2015), they can 
play an important role in policies aimed at promoting innovation and technology 
transfer within local, regional and national innovation systems (Kauffeld-Monz 
and Fritsch, 2013). In particular, as we will argue in this chapter, the range of 
activities that intermediaries engage in can potentially address numerous failures 
in their innovation systems (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). 
A number of policies around the globe have targeted intermediaries 
(Martin et al., 2011; Uotila et al., 2012; Knockaert et al., 2014; Fiordelmondo et 
al., 2014). However, policymakers can very rarely directly mandate the activities 
of intermediaries (which are usually private or public–private organisations or 
partnerships), so they need to create appropriate incentives for intermediaries to 
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satisfactorily address the system failures they are called to confront. A frequently 
used instrument is the conditioning of public funding on the intermediaries’ 
achievement of certain performance targets, measured through (usually 
quantitative) indicators. However, such incentives are likely to work only if there 
is close alignment between the indicators measuring the targets’ achievement and 
the policies’ intended objectives; hence, the identification of appropriate 
indicators is a complex operation that is crucial for a policy’s success. 
While a debate is emerging on how to evaluate intermediaries’ 
performance (Dalziel and Parjanen, 2012; Knockaert et al., 2014), little research 
exists on the extent to which performance indicators, particularly when they drive 
the allocation of public funding, can induce intermediaries to address their 
innovation system failures. Literature has shown that performance indicators are 
usually designed heuristically, often based on past experience, rather than 
grounded theoretically (Sizer, 1979; Jesson and Mayston, 1990; Molas-Gallart 
and Davies, 2006). As a result, one can find indicators that focus only on a few 
activities, or on relatively unimportant ones, just because they are easier to 
measure (Robichau and Lynn, 2009; Rossi and Rosli, 2015). Such indicators are 
ineffective, not only because they provide a partial evaluation of performance, but 
also because they create an implicit incentive system that alters the behaviour of 
the assessed units (Langford et al., 2006; Rafols et al., 2012; Teixeira and 
Koryakina, 2013). This incentive system can produce undesirable effects if it is 
not fully aligned with the policy objectives (European Commission, 2013). 
Our study aims to provide a theoretical framework to address the 
mismatch between the policies’ objectives to address innovation system failures, 
on the one hand, and the indicators used to evaluate the intermediaries’ 
performance, on the other. By suggesting that the measurement of the 
intermediaries’ performance should be explicitly linked to their success in 
remedying such failures, this approach can then provide a guide to the design of 
appropriate indicators. 
These issues are illustrated through a case study of publicly funded 
innovation intermediaries in the Italian region of Tuscany in 2011–2014. We 
show that the indicators used to allocate public funding induced the intermediaries 
to pursue behaviours that allowed them to reach their performance targets rapidly, 
but that were misaligned with the policy’s ultimate objectives. We then argue that 
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performance indicators that addressed more directly the innovation system 
failures the policy intended to mitigate, would have been more appropriate and 
consistent with policy goals. The applicability of our findings goes beyond the 
case of Tuscany: not only other Italian regions adopting similar innovation 
policies have used similar sets of indicators to evaluate the performance of 
innovation intermediaries, but some of these indicators are among the most 
commonly used by policymakers around the globe (Comacchio and Bonesso, 
2012; European Commission, 2013). 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the literature on 
system failures in relation to publicly funded innovation intermediaries and 
proposes a framework to conceptualise the intermediaries’ objectives in terms of 
remedying system failures. Section 2.3 presents the background to the case study, 
and Sections 2.4 and 2.5 discuss the limitations and effects of the indicators used 
by the regional government. Section 2.6 proposes the use of a systems failure 
framework to improve the evaluation of innovation intermediaries by aligning 
indicators with policy objectives. Section 2.7 concludes. 
 
2.2 A SYSTEMS FAILURE VIEW OF PUBLICLY FUNDED INNOVATION 
INTERMEDIARIES 
 
2.2.1 Intermediaries’ Activities in Addressing System Failures 
While policies supporting innovation and technology transfer have been 
traditionally motivated by the need to address market failures in the private 
funding of research and development (R&D) (Abramovski et al., 2004), leading to 
the development of policy instruments like R&D tax credits, grants or innovation 
vouchers, in recent years system failure rationales have become more pervasive: 
policy interventions are increasingly aimed at addressing failures in the 
functioning of innovation systems, whether involving specific actors, their 
interactions, or the system’s general infrastructures (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 
1993; Edquist, 1997; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). System failure rationales 
appear to underpin most policies targeting innovation intermediaries, whose 
activities enable them to support different types of actors within their innovation 
system, to facilitate interactions between them and to provide certain kinds of 
infrastructural support. Indeed, we argue that intermediaries can potentially 
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address all main types of system failures, as identified by Klein Woolthuis et al. 
(2005): infrastructural, capability, interaction and institutional failures. 
First, intermediaries can remedy failures in the information infrastructure 
of the innovation system (Malerba, 2009), by diffusing information about 
opportunities for collaborations with other actors (Bougrain and Haudeville, 
2002), as well as about useful and applicable techniques or technologies for 
product and service development (Howard Partners, 2007; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001). 
Second, intermediaries can play a role in helping firms, particularly small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), to boost their innovation capabilities by 
directly providing training or support services, or by intermediating the provision 
of services that are able to solve the actors’ managerial failures, which are a form 
of capabilities failures (Bessant and Rush, 1995). These failures occur when firms 
do not know how to acquire useful knowledge or technologies, or how to usefully 
implement them into product and services. Moreover, actors may be unaware of 
what knowledge or technologies they are lacking (Brusco, 1992; Kaufmann and 
Tödtling, 2002), which is a form of ‘awareness failure’. Through activities such as 
knowledge and technology mapping, innovation intermediaries can help actors 
gain awareness of what they need, in order to find the right way to obtain it. 
Third, intermediaries can create connections between people in different 
organisations, through networking activities such as targeted introductions and 
meetings, general networking, and provision of appropriate interaction spaces 
where actors can meet freely (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1998). This can be 
particularly helpful to newly created firms and SMEs, which are usually less open 
than other organisations to external collaborations (Rothwell and Dogdson, 1991). 
Intermediaries can support interactions also because they are (supposed to be) 
able to bridge different knowledge and competencies. One of their main 
capabilities is precisely that to solve cognitive failures, which occur when actors 
from different institutional backgrounds are too cognitively distant to adequately 
learn together (Nooteboom, 2000), or have different norms, values and incentive 
systems that hinder effective communication (Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009). 
Finally, intermediaries can address the lack of formal or informal 
institutions supporting innovation. They can provide firms with information, 
advice or other services related to formal institutions (e.g. support with patent 
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search and patent licensing). Furthermore, they can facilitate the emergence of 
social norms that underpin good innovative performance, as when their support 
for collaborations promotes mutual trust. 
 
 
 
Table 2.1 A system failures framework to conceptualise the key functions and 
related activities of publicly funded innovation intermediaries 
General system 
failures categories 
Specific system 
failures that can be 
addressed by 
intermediaries 
Sources of system failure Examples of innovation 
intermediaries’ activities that 
can help solve system failures 
Infrastructure 
failures 
Information failures Economic actors lack 
information about sources of 
external knowledge and 
opportunities 
Diffusion of information about 
existing opportunities 
Capabilities 
failures 
Managerial failures Economic actors are unable to 
exploit knowledge and 
opportunities due to lack of 
adequate competences and 
skills 
Direct provision of knowledge-
intensive services 
Intermediation in the provision 
of knowledge-intensive services 
Training and education activities  
Awareness failures Economic actors lack 
awareness of their own needs 
for information, knowledge, 
competences 
Knowledge and technology 
mapping 
 
Interaction 
failures 
Networking failures  Economic actors lack 
connections between them, due 
to weak or strong network 
failure 
Targeted introductions and 
meetings 
General networking 
Provision of interaction spaces  
Cognitive failures Economic actors are unable to 
interact due to cognitive 
distance 
Leading collaborative innovation 
projects 
Leading communication within 
interaction spaces 
Mobilizing resources for 
collective initiatives 
Institutional 
failures 
Formal or informal 
institutional failures 
Economic actors are unwilling 
to innovate due to the lack of 
formal or informal institutions 
Diffusion of information that can 
help the diffusion of formal 
institutions (e.g. on standards or 
intellectual property rights) 
Direct provision of services 
related to formal institutions (e.g. 
support for applying for a licence 
or a certification) 
Lobbying activity towards 
policymakers to stimulate the 
creation of formal institutions 
Facilitating the emergence of 
social norms that promote 
collaboration 
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By integrating the main categories of system failures identified by Klein 
Woolthuis et al. (2005) and their descriptions, with the above-mentioned literature 
on intermediaries’ activities, Table 2.1 summarizes the key system failures that 
innovation intermediaries can address, and the activities through which they may 
do so, with the ultimate objective to strengthen their innovation system. 
 
2.2.2. Problems in the Definition of Incentives for Intermediaries 
As the system failure framework provides an implicit or explicit rationale for 
public funding of innovation intermediaries, it is important for policymakers to 
create the appropriate incentives for intermediaries to properly address these 
failures. Linking the allocation of public funds to the achievement of performance 
targets, measured by indicators, is an increasingly common approach to attempt to 
incentivise intermediaries to act in accordance with policy objectives. Indeed, a 
vast literature has discussed how policymakers’ choice of indicators can influence 
the behaviour of the funding recipients (Paton, 2003; Freeman and Soete, 2009). 
However, setting appropriate performance indicators is not an easy task. Most 
evaluation exercises rely on performance indicators that measure the production 
of specific outputs that are considered desirable, but little attention is paid to the 
behavioural incentives that these performance indicators create, in order to ensure 
that they are aligned with the policy objectives (Comacchio and Bonesso, 2012; 
European Commission, 2013). 
Performance indicators should be complete, such as to cover all the 
relevant aspects of the policy. If this is not the case, intermediaries may aim for 
good performance scores in the indicators, disregarding other potentially 
important objectives, the attainment of some of which may not be easily 
measurable. Moreover, indicators should refer to the time span that is needed to 
achieve the desired results. Otherwise, intermediaries may be tempted to engage 
in activities that produce immediate outputs, and neglect activities that would 
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yield results only over a longer time horizon than that considered by evaluators.
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Finally, and more generally, indicators should be aligned with the objectives that 
the policy intends to achieve. Most of the indicators that are used in practice refer 
to the outputs that intermediaries produce (Comacchio and Bonesso, 2012) (e.g. 
how many patents have they applied for, or have they facilitated? How many 
collaboration agreements have they signed? How many services have they 
provided?). Simply producing more outputs, however, is rarely the objective of 
innovation policy. Instead, policies aim to encourage intermediaries to remedy the 
sources of system failures: to improve the resources (information, networks) and 
capabilities (competences, skills) of the economic actors in the system, thus 
leading to changes in their behaviours and performance. Indicators therefore 
should be closely linked to the outcomes that the economic actors in the system 
achieve thanks to the activity of the intermediaries. It must be noted that, recently, 
numerous criticisms of output indicators have led to greater emphasis on the use 
of outcome indicators (or results indicators), also in the evaluation of regional 
policy (European Commission, 2014). However, the use of outcome indicators in 
itself does not necessarily address the mismatch between the policy objectives and 
the indicators defined by policymakers: what matters is that these outcomes are 
aligned with those that the policy intends to achieve. 
We rely on a case study to illustrate the implications of the misalignment 
between performance indicators and policy objectives, and to showcase an 
improved approach to performance evaluation. The case study concerns a policy 
intervention implemented by the Italian region of Tuscany in 2011–2014, through 
which the regional government funded 12 innovation poles, a particular type of 
innovation intermediary. 
 
2.3 THE REGIONAL INNOVATION POLES 
 
 
1
 See, for example, Gulbrandsen and Rasmussen (2012), who show how, in the case of the Forny 
technology transfer programme in Norway, the use of the number of spin-off companies as an 
indicator to determine the annual bonus payments for technology transfer offices led the latter to 
launch too many firms too early. 
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Since the constitutional reform introduced in the 2000s, Italian regions have been 
responsible for most enterprise and innovation policy, and Tuscany is one of the 
more proactive regions in this respect (Caloffi and Mariani, 2017). Intermediaries 
have a long history in the region. They were first created in the 1960s as public–
private organisations (not involving universities) to provide consulting services to 
Tuscany’s many small firms. Many of them were specialised in some of the 
traditional ‘made in Italy’ sectors (footwear, jewellery, textiles and clothing), 
which were linked to the diffuse presence of industrial districts (Brusco, 1992). 
Others were specialised in high-tech emerging sectors such as robotics. Many 
intermediaries were small in size, and lacked the minimum scale needed to 
efficiently provide enterprises with high quality services. Most of them received 
financial support from the regional government in order to provide a range of 
services to the SMEs. Over time, with the decreasing importance of some 
industrial districts and the increasing need for technological innovation even in 
more traditional sectors, many intermediaries have become more transversal in 
sectoral terms and have started to focus on innovation. In 2010, to accelerate the 
intermediaries’ transformation, and strengthen their role in knowledge and 
technology transfer from university to industry, the region promoted the creation 
of innovation poles. This is the policy that we focus on in this study. 
As a first step, in 2010 Tuscany’s regional government identified a set of 
key technologies/applications and launched a call for tender inviting organisations 
to submit proposals for the creation of poles for a three-year period (2011–2014). 
Poles were consortia between universities and research centres, knowledge-
intensive service providers and firms. Each consortium was led by a managing 
organisation that decided what services to provide and how to organise the poles’ 
many activities. Firms that intended to use an innovation pole’s services would 
have to gain membership of that pole. 
For the first three years, the poles were experimental in character. 
Afterwards, having evaluated their accomplishments, the policymaker would then 
decide how to structure subsequent interventions in the field. Table 2.2 lists, for 
each innovation pole that had been selected for funding, its key 
technology/application, the number of organisations in the consortium and the 
number of members at the start (30.6.2011) and end (30.6.2014) of the three-year 
period. 
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The poles received regional funds to carry out the following activities:<nl> 
1. marketing to recruit new members, including technology mapping 
activities to encourage firms to demand knowledge-intensive services and 
to invest in innovation; 
2. direct provision of knowledge-intensive services; 
3. participation in regional, national and European R&D projects, and 
organisation of knowledge transfer programmes, workshops and seminars 
to facilitate knowledge sharing and networking among members; 
4. management of open access infrastructures such as research 
laboratories.</nl> 
 
 
Table 2.2 Key technologies/applications, consortium participants, pole members 
Innovation pole 
(acronym) 
Key technologies/applications No. 
consortium 
participants 
No. members 
as of 
30.06.2011 
No. members 
as of 
30.06.2014 
OPTOSCANA Optoelectronics for 
manufacturing and aerospace 
2 67 92 
INNOPAPER Paper 1 89 139 
OTIR 2020 Fashion (textiles, apparel, 
leather, shoes, jewellery) 
7 223 501 
VITA Life science 8 41 158 
PIETRE Marble 4 52 122 
PENTA Shipbuilding and maritime 
technology 
5 225 352 
POLIS Technologies for sustainable 
cities 
8 228 643 
NANOXM Nanotechnologies 6 70 128 
CENTO Furniture and interior design 6 177 322 
PIERRE Renewable energies and 
energy-saving technology 
13 120 368 
POLO12 Mechanics, particularly for 
automotive and transport 
6 198 390 
POLITER ICT (information and 
communication technologies) 
and robotics 
13 195 697 
Source: Our elaborations using data provided by Tuscany’s regional government. 
 
As a second step, the region provided some additional funds to encourage local 
firms to join the poles and participate in their activities: firms that bought 
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knowledge-intensive services, which were either directly provided or 
intermediated by the poles, would be given a subsidy equal to 80 per cent of the 
service’s price.2 
The policymakers expected the poles to expand the range of users of 
innovation services, particularly those SMEs that had little understanding of their 
needs and were unable to express a ‘demand for innovation’. By recruiting new 
member firms and mapping their needs, the poles would help firms to find the 
most appropriate knowledge-intensive services. In turn, by gaining access to 
knowledge-intensive services, SMEs would improve their innovation capabilities, 
which would generate positive spillovers in the regional innovation system. 
Public funding was allocated to innovation poles in two instalments: up to 
70 per cent over the period, and the rest at the end of the three years. The funding 
was conditional upon the achievement of a set of minimum performance targets, 
which were defined in relation to the whole period. The tender stated that 
innovation poles would be assigned to one of three possible ‘bands’ depending on 
how many members they had at the time of their launch. Different performance 
targets were set for the different bands. Targets were defined as minimum 
thresholds with respect to several indicators: 
1. percentage increase in the number of member firms; 
2. number of member firms that were offered knowledge and technology 
mapping services; 
3. number of services provided to firms, and revenue from the sale of 
services. 
Table 2.3 shows, for each band, the minimum number of members 
required at the start of the period, the performance targets to be achieved over the 
three years, and the maximum funding that poles could claim from the regional 
government had they reached these targets. 
 
 
 
2 This incentive existed before the creation of the poles: since 2008, SMEs could apply for public 
subsidies for the purchase of various types of knowledge-intensive services. The admission to 
the incentive was semi-automatic (it was based on compliance with a set of formal criteria, 
including company size) and granted a reduction in the range of 20–60 per cent on the cost of the 
service. 
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Table 2.3 Innovation poles’ classification into bands: criteria, performance tar-
gets and maximum funding that could be claimed 
 Criterion for 
allocation into 
bands: 
Performance targets to be achieved within three years 
(minimum thresholds) 
Maximum 
funding that 
could be 
claimed from 
the regional 
government 
 No. member 
firms (at launch) 
% increase 
in the 
number of 
member 
firms 
No. firms to be 
offered 
knowledge and 
technology 
mapping 
services  
No. firms to 
be offered 
knowledge-
intensive 
services 
 
Revenue 
from the 
sale of 
services 
 
Band 1 > 160 50 160 40 500,000 € 800,000 € 
Band 2 > 80 50 80 20 300,000 € 600,000 € 
Band 3 > 40 50 40 10 150,000 € 400,000 € 
Source: Our elaborations using data provided by Tuscany’s regional government. 
 
In what follows we discuss these indicators in the light of their capacity to 
promote the achievement of the policy’s objectives, and we provide some 
evidence about the extent to which they induced behaviours that were misaligned 
with these objectives. 
Our empirical analysis builds upon several data sources, which we 
assembled as part of a research team engaged in the analysis of the policy 
programme. The main source is administrative, as we collected information on 
poles’ structure, activities and performance, as well as on poles’ member firms, 
from the reports that were provided to us by Tuscany’s regional government. 
Then, we performed a number of interviews with the policymakers managing the 
programme (in March and May 2014), the poles’ managing organisations (an 
online survey in March–April 2015 and a focus group in May 2015),3 and the 
poles’ member firms. 
 
 
 
3 The first email inviting the managing organisations to take part in the survey was sent on 27 
March 2015, followed by two recalls sent to non-respondents only. Fourteen (30 per cent) out of 
the 46 managing organisations responded to the survey, 12 of these being the consortium leaders 
for the 12 poles. We focused our analysis on the 12 completed questionnaires received from the 
12 consortium leaders. 
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2.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE INDICATORS USED BY THE REGIONAL GOV-
ERNMENT 
In order to detect any mismatch between policy objectives and the performance 
indicators that were established by the regional policymaker, we review the 
indicators in light of the objectives stated in the policy documents (Regione 
Toscana, 2010) (Table 2.4). Then, in what follows, we put forward the 
consequences of this misalignment for the poles’ incentives to address system 
failures. 
The first objective – to promote and meet the demand for innovation on 
the part of local firms, particularly SMEs and more fragile firms, which are not 
able to express such demand – referred to awareness problems that could prevent 
SMEs from identifying their main needs and devising appropriate strategies to 
satisfy them. Here, the reference to specific system failures was clearly outlined. 
The policymaker defined two indicators (minimum percentage increase in number 
of members and in the number of new member firms to be offered knowledge and 
technology mapping services) that measured the poles’ engagement in recruiting 
members and marketing services to them. However, these indicators did not 
capture whether and to what extent the poles had been successful in solving the 
information and awareness failures that could affect local firms. These indicators 
may even have undermined the attainment of this objective since, in order to 
easily reach the target, poles could have chosen to approach firms that were easy 
to reach (e.g. firms that were known beforehand to the poles) rather than the most 
fragile firms, with greater awareness problems. 
The second objective – ‘to expand the number of firms accessing high 
value-added knowledge-intensive services, in order to promote the diffusion of 
innovation across pole members and with external firms’ (Regione Toscana, 
2010) – was to address, and possibly solve, managerial failures. The remaining 
two indicators (minimum number of firms to be offered knowledge-intensive 
services, and minimum revenue from the sale of services) may be related to this 
policy objective. However, also in this case the indicators were not directly 
measuring whether the poles had been successful in addressing managerial 
failures in regional firms, and, indeed, the indicators may have undermined the 
attainment of the second objective: in order to easily reach the targets, poles could 
have provided services to firms that were more willing to buy services (e.g. to 
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firms that were already buying services, or to more innovative firms) rather than 
to firms with managerial problems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 Comparison between policy objectives and performance indicators 
Policy objective Type of system failure 
addressed 
Performance indicators 
Poles should promote and 
meet the demand for 
innovation, particularly in 
SMEs and more fragile 
firms who were unable to 
express such demand 
Information failures 
Awareness failures 
% increase in number of 
members 
Minimum number of new 
member firms to be offered 
knowledge and technology 
mapping services  
Poles should expand the 
number of firms accessing 
high value-added 
knowledge-intensive 
services 
Managerial failures Minimum number of firms to 
be offered knowledge-
intensive services 
Minimum revenue from the 
sale of services  
Poles should help firms gain 
access to scientific and tech 
knowledge, and to networks 
and resources at national 
and international level 
Poles should support the 
sharing of equipment and 
certification labs  
Networking failures 
Cognitive failures 
– 
 
The policymaker also had two other objectives. However, no performance 
indicators were set that could be linked to those. As a consequence, poles could 
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have chosen not to perform these activities (or to put very little effort into them) 
because they were not relevant to their performance evaluation. 
In what follows, we focus on the empirical analysis of the potentially 
misaligned incentives created by performance indicators, while in Section 2.6 we 
reflect on process and outcome indicators that could be used to support 
intermediaries in addressing system failures. 
 
2.5 MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN POLES’ INCENTIVES AND POLICY OB-
JECTIVES 
Even a quick glance at the poles’ performance suggests that the targets were 
probably too low, given that most poles reached them very rapidly. This can be 
seen in Table 2.5, which summarises the results achieved by each innovation pole 
in the period 2011–2014, ordered by band, and highlights with an asterisk those 
cases in which the targets had been reached in less than half the time allocated to 
these activities. 
All poles reached at least one of their performance targets within the first 
six months, and most of them had reached at least two targets within the first year. 
Moreover, all poles had reached all of their performance targets within two years. 
While the targets could have been easy to reach in an absolute sense, this might 
suggest the presence of incentives for the poles to act in ways that were 
misaligned with the policy’s objectives: innovation poles may have strategically 
implemented actions aimed at achieving the targets, regardless of whether such 
actions were aligned with their ultimate objectives to address failures in the 
innovation system. 
To assess whether this might have been the case, we investigated several 
ways in which performance indicators might have affected the behaviour of the 
innovation poles. In order to do so, we tried to define some very simple indicators 
that can be used to identify the potential misalignment between the poles’ 
incentives, on the one hand, and the policy objectives put forward in Table 2.4, on 
the other. 
 
Table 2.5 Performance targets and their achievement 
Innovation pole % increase in the 
number of 
Firms with 
knowledge and 
Services 
provided 
Revenue 
15 
member firms 
(above the 
minimum initial 
threshold for 
each band) 
technology 
mapping 
 
% no. no. € 
Minimum target for 
Band 1 
50 160 40 500,000 
Poles’ final performance  
  
OTIR 2020 213*  278* 93 1,592,970* 
PENTA 120*  236* 100    911,084* 
POLIS 303*  274* 88 1,022,348* 
CENTO 101* 190  115* 1,739,283* 
POLO12 146*  249*  267* 1,924,012* 
POLITER 338*  286*  191* 2,259,204* 
Minimum target for 
Band 2 
50 80 20 300,000 
Poles’ final performance  
  
INNOPAPER 73*  94 455*    711,608* 
PIERRE 363* 120  64* 1,082,638* 
Minimum target for 
Band 3 
50 40 10 150,000 
Poles’ final performance  
  
OPTOSCANA 130*    56  42*    312,210* 
VITA 295*    73* 31    249,893* 
PIETRE 205*    81 18 1,799,400* 
NANOXM 222*    44* 25    880,223* 
Note: * Poles that achieved the target within the first three semesters of activity. 
Source: Our elaborations using data provided by the innovation poles to document their 
performance, reference period: 1 July 2011–30 June 2014. 
 
2.5.1 Misaligned Incentives of Indicators Related to the First Objective 
Recruiting members among firms that were easy to reach and mapping their needs 
To check whether poles recruited and provided mapping services to firms that 
were easy to reach, for example those they had already worked with prior to the 
policy programme, rather than focus on firms that were outside their established 
networks, we investigated how many of the member firms had participated 
together with the poles in previously funded activities. Based on information 
gathered from archives related to previous regional policies that supported R&D 
collaborations, we found that, on average, 20.3 per cent of member firms had 
already cooperated with the poles’ managing organisations. 
16 
Member recruitment without further activity 
To check whether poles simply recruited members without intending to work 
closely with them, but just to achieve their membership targets, we calculated how 
many of the member firms did not buy any services from the poles and did not 
engage in any activity intermediated by the poles. On average, the poles involved 
only two member firms out of ten in some innovation-related activities, while the 
remaining eight firms were contacted only to become members, without being 
subsequently involved in any activity. In particular, out of the 3,066 member 
firms, only 586 firms bought some innovation service offered directly by the poles 
of which they were members (19.1 per cent). A further 75 firms bought services 
from the poles without being members. 
 
2.5.2 Misaligned Incentives of Indicators Related to the Second Objective: 
Providing Services to Firms that Were Already Accustomed to Demanding Them, 
or to the Most Innovative Firms 
If we consider only the 586 firms that bought services from the poles, 206 firms 
(35.2 per cent) had already benefited from a public incentive to buy knowledge-
intensive services, before the poles were created. These firms accounted for 27.2 
per cent of the services provided and 42.7 per cent of the value of these services. 
So, on average, these firms demanded more expensive (which generally meant 
more complex and more knowledge-intensive) services. It is also interesting to 
observe that, of the 206 firms that had already requested services from the 
previous policy programmes, almost half (92, that is 15.7 per cent of the set of 
firms that bought services from the poles) went on to demand the same type of 
services from the poles. For these firms, the poles appear to have simply crowded 
out other service providers. 
In conclusion, we found that 35.2 per cent of the firms that demanded 
services from the poles would have been able to buy them even without the 
intermediation of the poles; for half of these firms, the poles simply crowded out 
other services providers instead of providing different services. 
2.5.3 Misaligned Incentives of Indicators Related to the Third Objective: 
Avoiding Activities Whose Performance Was Not Measured by Indicators 
Our survey of the poles’ managing organisations suggests that 11 poles out of 12 
carried out activities in order to support member firms’ access to scientific and 
17 
technological knowledge, and to networks and resources at national and 
international level. However, about 40 per cent of the member firms that we 
interviewed claimed to have been contacted by the poles only once, to recruit 
them as members. 
Based on this information, poles seem to have put little effort into 
performing these activities, even if they were required to achieve some policy 
objectives. Therefore, also in this case, the indicators (or lack thereof) seem to 
have produced misaligned incentives. 
Summarising, through our empirical analysis we found some evidence that 
the poles adopted behaviours that were misaligned with the policy’s objectives. 
Most member firms (eight out of ten) did not demand any knowledge-intensive 
services. Moreover, 40 per cent of the member firms were contacted only to 
become members, without being involved in any subsequent innovation-related 
activities. Of the member firms that demanded services, about a third had already 
demanded services from the previous policy, so the poles’ intervention may not 
have been necessary for them, and may have even crowded out other existing 
providers. 
 
2.6 TOWARDS A BETTER APPROACH TO EVALUATING THE 
PERFORMANCE OF INNOVATION INTERMEDIARIES 
The performance indicators used by the regional government had several 
limitations. First, they were incomplete because they only focused on some of the 
poles’ activities. Second, they were not explicitly designed to support the 
achievement of policy objectives. Much of the recent debate on the evaluation of 
intermediaries’ performance focuses on the need to introduce outcome indicators 
that capture significant changes in the behaviours of beneficiary firms and 
significant social and economic effects at various levels of analysis. However, 
while the use of outcome indicators is crucial in order to understand the overall 
effects of the policy programme, it might not in itself correct the misalignment 
between the incentives created by the indicators and the policy’s objectives, if the 
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indicators are not aligned with the latter. Instead, we argue that the key problem 
when defining performance targets and performance indicators (especially, but not 
only, when they are used to allocate public funding) is to closely align such 
indicators with the policy’s objectives.4 
Building on the system failures framework outlined in Table 2.1, and on 
findings from our case study, we derive some implications for the development of 
performance indicators that can effectively incentivise intermediaries to address 
system failures in their innovation system. 
First, policymakers should identify the full range of intermediaries’ 
activities and pay particular attention to those that are instrumental in addressing 
the key failures, thus avoiding the omission of important activities from the 
evaluation just because they are less visible or less easy to measure. This 
addresses a very common problem in performance measurement (Robichau and 
Lynn, 2009; Rossi and Rosli, 2015). In the case of Tuscany, focusing on the full 
range of intermediaries’ activities directed at addressing system failures would 
have entailed including additional indicators relating to networking and sharing of 
laboratories and equipment. 
Second, performance indicators should be clearly linked to policy 
objectives (European Commission, 2013). Output indicators should be defined 
carefully in order to precisely capture policy objectives; for example, in the case 
of Tuscany, rather than measuring the overall number of organisations the 
intermediary provided services to, the indicator should have only focused on 
organisations that had not previously demanded services, with a clear link to the 
policy objective to ‘expand the number of firms accessing high value-added 
knowledge-intensive services’. Outcome indicators should measure whether, 
thanks to the intermediaries’ activities, the economic actors in the innovation 
system have acquired resources (information, services, contacts) and engaged in 
learning processes that have allowed them to improve their capabilities to engage 
 
 
4
 It must be remarked that although the performance-based indicators we analysed seem to have 
generated some misaligned incentives, this does not mean that the policy as a whole was ineffec-
tive. Establishing this would have required an appropriate ex post evaluation, possibly including 
a counterfactual analysis. 
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in innovation (e.g. through better communication and negotiation skills, greater 
awareness of their own abilities and limitations, greater understanding of the 
process of collaboration, greater trust and openness towards external 
collaborations) which in turn have led to changes in their behaviours (e.g. greater 
networking activity, changes in the types of partners they interact with, changes in 
the type of innovation processes they perform) and possibly in their performance 
(more innovation, greater profitability and so on). In the case of Tuscany, 
outcome indicators could have measured whether regional firms had changed their 
behaviours (e.g. greater networking activity, changes in the types of partners they 
interacted with, changes in the type of innovation processes they performed) and 
possibly their performance (more innovation, greater profitability and so on), 
thanks to the poles’ activities.5 Table 2.6 summarizes such possible indicators. 
The proposed measures are classified by policy objective, and corresponding 
system failures, and by their type (direct output, indirect output, or outcome 
indicators). 
 
Table 2.6 Policy objectives, expected outcomes and proposed indicators 
Types of system 
failures addressed 
Proposed direct and indirect output 
indicators 
Proposed outcome indicators 
Information failures, 
awareness failures 
Number of new (not previously known) 
firms recruited 
Number of new (not previously known) 
firms mapped 
Number and value of follow-up activities 
carried out with the firms recruited 
Number of new firms that were offered 
mapping services, that engaged in follow-
up activities 
Changes in firms’ internal innovation 
behaviour: nature and types of 
investments in innovation; nature and 
value of the research project proposals 
submitted and funded; types of innovation 
strategies 
Managerial failures Number and value of services provided or 
intermediated by the innovation 
intermediary to firms that had not 
demanded that kind of services before, or 
that had never demanded services 
Number of firms receiving services 
Changes in firms’ demand for knowledge-
intensive services: number of firms 
demanding services; number of services 
demanded 
 
 
5 In order to capture the actual contribution of the innovation poles to the changes in the 
behaviours of the beneficiary firms, outcomes can be evaluated not just descriptively but also 
causally, through the counterfactual tools of the so-called econometrics of programme evaluation 
(Imbens and Rubin, 2015). However, the application of these tools to the field of system failures 
is still in its infancy. 
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directly provided or mediated by the 
innovation intermediary that had not 
demanded that kind of services before, or 
that had never demanded services 
Number and value of subsequent services 
provided to these firms 
Number of firms receiving services that 
requested further services 
Networking failures, 
cognitive failures 
Number of events held (by type of event) 
Number of firms participating in events 
Number and value of follow-up activities 
carried out with these firms 
Number of firms involved in events, that 
engaged in follow-up activities 
Changes in firms’ networking behaviour: 
size and composition of networks of 
relationships; number and types of 
collaborative projects 
 
 
2.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In recent years, policymakers have relied on intermediaries to stimulate the 
innovative capacity of firms (especially those that are not able to express their 
demand for innovation), to find new partners to work with, new knowledge and 
new technologies. In addition, intermediaries can play an important role in 
strengthening the connections between actors within an innovation system. 
However, if the intermediaries’ incentives are not aligned to the pursuit of these 
objectives, there are few reasons to believe that these objectives will be achieved. 
While evaluation exercises often analyse whether the intermediaries’ 
behaviour was in line with the stated aims of the policy, very rarely do they seek 
to understand the extent to which this behaviour was affected by the policy 
design. Our study attempted to bring to light the possible misaligned incentives 
created by indicators that were not fully in line with the policy’s objectives; it 
found that the policy had incentivised the innovation intermediaries to focus on 
some activities and not on others, and to provide support to firms that did not 
necessarily need it. 
Building on a theoretical framework linking intermediaries’ activities to 
the remedy of system failures and on the analysis of our empirical evidence, we 
derive some general policy implications that go beyond the specific case we 
studied. 
First, in order to create incentives for innovation intermediaries to properly 
address innovation system failures, the latter should be identified clearly, by 
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rewording policy objectives in terms of system failures. All policy objectives and 
all important activities performed by the intermediaries should be considered, 
without neglecting some just because they are less visible or less easy to measure. 
Second, indicators should be clearly linked to policy objectives: traditional 
output indicators should be carefully reconsidered, in order to clearly mirror 
policy objectives, and they should also be accompanied by outcome indicators 
measuring whether the economic actors targeted by the policy had changed their 
behaviours and possibly their performance thanks to the activities performed by 
the intermediaries (as in the example presented in Table 2.6). 
Finally, attention should be paid to trade-offs. By setting indicators that are 
simple to compute and not too demanding in terms of data requirements, the 
intermediaries only need to invest a limited amount of resource in the evaluation 
process, and can engage in more productive activities instead. But indicators are 
often too loosely related to the policy’s ultimate objectives to address failures both 
at firm level and at system level. To achieve a balance it is necessary to ensure 
that a link between indicators and policy objectives is maintained even as 
indicators are kept as simple as possible. For example, in some cases the 
collection of outcome indicators may prove too costly, or outcomes may only 
become apparent after an extensive length of time whereas performance 
measurement needs to be done relatively quickly. In such cases, the indicators 
may focus only on output measures of intermediaries’ performance: as long as 
these output indicators are strongly connected with policy objectives (as in the 
example presented in Table 2.6), they may be sufficient to incentivise 
intermediaries to effectively address system failures. 
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